PHENOMENOLOGY AND NEW RHETORIC Steven James Bartlett Website: http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet A monograph presented in conjunction with the Conference on New Rhetoric Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Santa Barbara, California Recorded presentation followed by a discussion among the Fellows of the Center on Wednesday, February 25, 1970 KEYWORDS: new rhetoric, phenomenology, self-reference, projection, projective misconstruction © Steven James Bartlett, 1970, 2014 The author has chosen to issue this work as a free open access publication under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license, which allows anyone to distribute this work without changes to its content, provided that both the author and the original URL from which this work was obtained are mentioned, that the contents of this work are not used for commercial purposes or profit, and that this work will not be used without the author's or his executor's permission in derivative works (i.e., you may not alter, transform, or build upon this work without such permission). The full legal statement of this license may be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode CONTENTS Introduction 1 Sectio n One: Phenomenology 9 1.1 9 1.2 9 1.3 � 1.4 The general nature of phenomenology The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl A new approach to phenomenology: de-projection The two approaches to phenomenology Section Two: New Rhetoric 9 2.1 The concept of a new rhetori c 9 2.2 The concept of audience-relati vi ty � 2.3 The concept of universal audience � 2.4 Audience-pluralism � 2.5 Autophagia 9 2.6 The concept of sel f-evidence § 2.7 Conviction and rationality Section Three: Towards a Unified ConceRt of Reality New rhetoric and the doctrine of absolute truth Fundamental concerns shared by strict phenomenology and new rhetoric 9 3*3 Facts 9 3.4 The complementarity of facts 2 16 30 34 36 37 40 41 43 46 50 51 55 58 l .... PHENOMENOLOGY AND NEW RHETORIC Introduction This paper has three purposes. It attempts first to describe in general terms methods of investigation proper to strict phenomenology and to new rhetoric. Second, it advances certain recent developments in phen omenological method which appear to be of potential significance in a variety of areas of study, including that of new rhetoric. Finally, several suggestions are made with a view to bringing porti ons of phenomenology into close connection with certain of the basic concerns of new rhetoric. The paper as a whole arises out of a tradition of epidictic rhetoric, since its fundamental concern is to promote a group of values Shared by a community. The nature of these values and of the community advocating acceptance of t hem, will become clear shortly. l Section One: Phenomenology � 1.1 The general nature of phenomenology. Ch. Perelman has made the following observatio n: Initiation into a giv en discipline cons ists in communicating its rule s, techniques, specifi c ideas, and presuppositions, as well as the method of criticizing its results in terms of the discipline's own requirements. [TA: 100]* I will attempt to direct my comments in this general fashion 2 in communicating th e nature of the phenomenological undertaking. The specific di scipline which will be described here forms a specialized portion of the relatively little known field of phenomenology. I do not propose, however, to give a general survey of phenomenology. Nevertheless, I recognize * References frequently cited in this paper are ab breviated in the following manner: [TA: 100] refers to page 100 of Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric; A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1969). [IJPA; 5] refers to page 5 of Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 196J). [CSDI] refers to the Conference on the New Rhetoric at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, January 19-21, 1970. When cited in conjunction with a paper, [CSDI] indicates that the paper was presented at the above Conference. that some ba ckground material is in order, in terms of which certain recent developments in the field can be describe d. 3 My comments can neither do the job of an introduction to phenomenology, nor can the y reflect more than a small portion of recent phenomenological research. I say th is so that the reader's expectations may be realistic. Phenomenology, when first approached, seems excessively top-heavy with what appear s to be a high-flown terminology, and a paucity of co ncrete illustrations. The reason for this dirth of examples lies in the nature of the phenomenological undertaking. Phenomenology, as will be seen, would attempt to re-interpret experience, beginning with what is most fundamental. Because nearly all examples embody concepts which themselves stand in need of phenomenological clarification, I will almost always be forced to refrain from giving concrete illus trati ons. I realize, on the other hand , that this limitation will sometimes restrict how well the r eader will grasp what the task of phenomenology is. This handicap to communication is, at least in part, inherent in the natu re of the d iscipli ne; furthermore, I cannot provide the reader with an idea of the range of issues basic to phenamenogy, as to do so would require expansion of the discussion beyond what is relevant and of interest vis-a-vis new rhetoric. Phenomenology is not, in my opinion, susceptible to a general definition which would encompass the divergent views of th ose who have been called, or who have called themselves, 4 0phenomenologists." The field of phen omenology is now criss-crossed by a multitude of special or ientations and sometimes incompatible schools of thought. Phenomen ology is certai nly not alone in this lack of internal unity, and it will not be my intention to construct bridges which might deceptively veil disagreements in orientation between the vario us species of phenomenologies. When I use the term 'phenomenology', what I shall intend is a more or less cl ear-cut field of research which can be represented by means of a series of selective idealizations of positi ons taken by certain of the outstandin g figures of phenomenological literature. I use the phrase 'selective idealizatio n ' in the sense that none of th e positions I will represent in ideal form consistently are expressed in that form, for a particular thinker will frequently develop through a succession of views. What I shall do is to represent a certain domain of inquiry by reference to positi ons some phenomenologists have adhered to, even though a position may later have given way to a quite different view unrelated to the kind of phenomenology the development of which I should like to describe. Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, a former Head of the Departme nt of Cultural Activities of Unesco, has written: The influence of Husser! has revoluti onized con tinental philosophies, not because his philo- sophy has become dominant, but because any [continental] philosophy now seeks to accomodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, ... .. . . phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, w hen he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis With which he is familiar • • • • No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and termino- logy, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature. (''Philo sophie Thought in France and the United States", in Philoso J hy and Phenomenological Research XI (1951 , J$0.) It would, as I have suggested, be difficult to respond to this challenge by giving a general definition of 5 phenomenology; within a given set of restrictions, however, the task is made feasible. It has been suggested by many phenomenologists that what unites them is not nheir common acceptance of a group of conclusions, but a common method and common concern for a collection of philosop hical issues. Such a statement is to* be found on the prospectus sent out by the publisher and later printed at the head of the Jahrbuch fUr Philo§ophie ung phanomenologische Forschung, whose editors included Edmund Husserl, Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfander, Adolt Reinach, IJJ:ax Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Oskar Becker. A portio n of that statement runs as follows: It is not a system that the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition and to insights in to essential structures derived from them that we shall be ... able to put to use the gre at traditio ns of philosophy with their concepts and problems; only thus shall we be in a position to clarify such concepts intuitively, to restate the problems on an intuitive basis, and th us, eventually, to solve them, at least in principle. It is a gener al description of a position, but not one which ca n be said unambiguously to identify a strictly phenomenological apprQ�ch; certainly, the place "intuition" plays in* a return to "primary sources" is .not clear. In a letter of September 2, 1770, to Johann Heinrich Lambert, Kant expressed enthusi asm for the notion of a "negative science" a phaenomenologica generalis which was to precede metaphysics as a purely propaedeutic discipline. This idea of,phenomenology as providing a Critique of Impure Reason influenced the development phenomenology was to take later at the hands of Edmund Husserl. But tha t influence became': somewhat etiolated in the later life of Husserl, and particularly so in the period after Hussa:1' s death, when *'phenomenology' took a place in titles of less critic al stud ies of the field in its more existential *�,nd humanistic implications. The notion of phenomenology as a strict science rapidly came into decline; the idea of pure scientific phenomenology gener ally has little affinity with conte mporary phenomenology. It is this portion of phenomenological research which I will comment upon, while I will describe a few recent **seneri .. ,., * ... = -**j developments which have been made in this area. I should like to suggest early in this discussion tha t it was phenomenology in its pure scientific form which* may be pointed to as the father of its later existen tialist variations. For philosopher s of an existential persuasion, it shou ld be of some interest to note that very different kind of philosophy which led to the hybrid "existential phenomenology." To an extent, it can be argued that scientific phenomenology developed in sympathetic agreement with Descartes' belief that each philosopher must make his own radical beginnings, in which he is to ,adopt his I own reasoned judgment as ulti mate arbiter. Perhaps it could even be said that Edmund Husserl made his philosophical mission the development of a scientifi cally effective Cartesiansism in this sense. Husserl demanded that concepts basic to our theories of theories and theories of action be thoroughly and rigourously explored. Such a thorough exploration, he believed, is a pre- . ' condition for adequate understanding. This task requires that the investigator bring no assumptions to his work which he cannot bring to full clarity, or show to be deducible from other presuppositions which are fully grasped. Husserl developed*a procedure whereby the field of experienc e can be elucidated, free from the distortion of pre-critically accepted prejudices. This procedure he 7 .... 8 considered to be scient ific in the sense that phenomenological analyses,would reflect the scientific rigour of the deductive sciences, rather than the scientific rigour of . the tnductive natural sciences. It is to a brief description of Husserl's phenomenological method that I will now tum. � 1.2 The phenom�nology of Edmund Husserl. Of significant influence to the development of Husserl's phenomenological method were two program matic ideals, one suggested by Franz Brentano, and the other by Carl Stu mpf. In Brentano's two works, Psychology from an E mpirical Standpoint (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt: i"874; complete edition 1924-28) and The Origin and Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis: 1889), the idea is developed of an investigation of idealized types, in w hich a selective experience of the essential features of pheno mena is described, thoug h not in great detail. In Stumpf's Appearances and Psychical Functions (Erscheinungen und psychische Functionen: 1906), the concept is developed of phenomenology as a neutral pre-science investigating the "building materials" of the sped al sciences. Both Brentano's notion of an investigation of idealize d types, and Stumpf's idea of a neutral pre-science ... 'I concerned with the foundations of the various sciences, exerted a strong_ effect upon Husserl' s thought. Of his phenomenology, Husserl says: I attempt to guide, not to instruct, but merely to show and to describe what I see. All I claim is the right to speak according to my best lights primarily to myself and correspondingly to others as one who has lived through a ?hilosophical existence in all its seriousness. lKrisis, Husserliana VI, 17) Husserl's phenomenology wou ld attempt to turn back to the sou rces of which excessively hasty thought has lost sight. The principal use of his phenomenolo�cal method . is to permit a critical exa mination of what is indubitably given, before pre-critical impu rities rush in, in the form of prejudices concerning the world and opinions obtai ned from individual *cases taken from the world of facts. The elimination of these impurities is accomplished through various reductions, two of which are distinguished here: first, there is the eidetic reduction, in which reference . to the individual and particular is dropped, permitting a descripti on of phenomen a, freed from the complications ... *c}. /*'/ *'* . . arising from considerations of particular cases. (I digress to point out that a similar "reduction" is performed under a different rubric in modern dimensional analysis and similarity theory. There it is included under the heading of "gener alized analysis.") Second, the phenomenological reduction, which in Husserl's writings is sometimes synonymous with his transcendental reduction, �*�*�--* - ---... 0 'i f fP requires the suspension of belief in existence, while an injunction is established against transcendent references. This second reductio n may be thou�ht to comprise a declaration of unconditional and unprejudiced scientific neutrality. Judgment consequently is suspended on questio ns of existence and transcendence, and on all matters of fact. Together with these, assumptions grounded in fact and theories :relating.��to the natural world are bracketed. is V:iews pertaining to the world as it/naively and unquestioningly accepted are set aside as hindrances to a clear description \ of things as the y are given in experience. Wit h naive assumptions out of the running, scientific transcendental phenomenology attempts to investigate any concept or object from the standpoint of those conditions which must be granted, and without which the concept or object becomes impossible. The natural sciences, taken in general, attempt to study phenomena with an end to discovering the most fundamental principles governing the structure of those phenomena and of their behavior in a variable environment. Phenomenology, on the other hand, attempts to bring to light the p rinciples involved whe n the possibiliti of a given phenomenon is thrown into questi on. Phenome nology performs analyses on the level of the possibility of phenomena, while the natural sciences undertake to understand physical phenomena on the level of .. 11 their given, factural and general structur e. Transcendental philosophy has made clear that the conditio ns which must be grante d in order to provide for the possibility of a given phenomenon, will at once be those conditi ons underlying the investigatio n of that phenomenon from the standpoint of the special sciences. For thi s reason, pure phenomenology was characterized by Husserl as the sc ience of sciences, or the theory of theor�es. Definitions articulated from the standpoint of Husserl's scientific pheno menology are to be based on a recognition of the essent ial connections given bet ween the things a definition attempts to connect. Furthermore, phenomenological descriptions must rely, first, upon direct insight into essential structures of phenomena, and of their modes of represent ation in consciousness; and, secon d, upon direct intuition as the source and fina l test of all knowledge, faithfully to be assimilated in phenomenological descriptions. The still unclarified notions of the "given" and of "direct intuition" are the final grounds to whic h an appeal is made for justification in phenomenological investigations. In connection with his notion of the original given sources, Husserl admonishes the investigator not to hunt deductively after constructio ns unrelated to the matter in question, but to derive all knowledge from its ultimate sources, .from principles seen authentically and understood as insights; not to be diverted by any ... prejudic es, by any verbal con tradictions or indeed by anything • • • , even under the name of "exact science", but to grant its right to whatever is clearly seen, whi ch constitutes the 'original', or what precedes all theories, or what sets the ultimate norm. ( "Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den Logi schen Untersuchungen" (1913), ed. by Eugen Fink, in Tijdschrift voor Philosophi§ I (1939), 116-7) Specifically, Husser�'s notion of "the given" arose in a controversy over whether or not givenness should be positivistically restricted to particu lar experience. It was Husserl's observation that there are factors in the material of experience which direct or structur e experience in channels not of the choosing of the subject; it is to these objective elements that Husserl's doctrine of givenness is meant to draw attention. Husserl says little more of "the g iven" than this. Now, as far as the notion of "direct intuition" is concerned, Husserl speaks of intuition or insight into general essences, which are expressed in rel ation to a study of representative examples. Such a study provides the basis for any generalizing "ideation". Representative examples ' ' . .. . are subjected to free variation, so that a general essence emerges from a collection of examples in which individuating characteristi cs are subordinated to the principle conditio ning their unity. The task of ideation extends, moreover, to a method*ical grasp of conditioning relati onships obtaining between gene ral essences. It is in the particular, th ough *_ ... ,..:::re::::: ... ... ...... 13 somewhat vague, sense that representative examples can yield a judgment concerning their essential structure, and in the sense that essential relat ions between general forms of structure can be rigourously determined, that phenomenology is said to rely upon the intuiting of phenomena in whiGh; Husserl believes, all genuine knowledge finds its last verification. He maintains that Every type::of first-hand intuiting forms<.a*.: legitimate sour ce of knowledge; whatever presents itself to us by "intuition" at first hand, in its authentic reality, as it were, is to be accepted simply for the thing as it presents itself, yet only within the limits within which it present s itself. (Ideen I, § 24) The notion of these "limits within which the intuited presents itself" is not fully developed in Husserl; it will become the subject of further discussion somewhat later. By way of a partial summary to this point, it can perhaps be said that the origin al vision of scientific phe nomenology consiste.p:; in a desire to elucidate the conditio ning structure, the constitution, of phenomena, the essential forms of which express the nature of the domain of possible experience. Husserl's desire to clarify .these "foundations" appeared in the context of what he believed to be a crisis in scientific endeavor: be observed that the faith in science as a panacea for a ll the ills and problems of our time was confronted by a ,., .... =- - ... 14 rapidly spreading loss of this faith by front-line research scientists, particularly.!in relatio n to the development of modern quantum theory and relativity physic s. After World War I, Husserl saw that science was greatly in need of a philosophy which cou ld restore its relevance to the deeper co nc erns of man. For Husserl, the theoretical fou ndations of science were becoming increasingly obscure, while the r elationship of scie nce to li fe was becoming correspondingly tenuous. It was his conviction that scientific phenomenology could meet these needs. In its conc ern over 11foundations", phenomenology was to be a ,.first science", where th e beginnings of theory were to be subjected to careful and rigourous analysis. In this sense, Husserl felt himself the perpectual beginner; he says in self-appraisal of his task: .... , � , Even though for practical purposes the author had to tone down the ideal of hi s philosop hical ambitions to thop e of a mere beginner, he has, at least fo�nis own person in his ol d age, reache d the p erfect certainty that he can call himself a true beginner. He could almost dare to hope that, if he were granted the age of a Methuselah, he might still. become a philosopher. He has been able to pursue the p roblems of a descriptive phenomeno- logy (the beginning of the beginning) further and further and to develop it in examples instructive at leas t to himself. The encompassing horizon for the work of a phenomenological philosop hy has unfolded according to what may be called* its main geographical structures, and the essential layers of p roblems and the methods of / . --::r- ---- *-*-.... ..... _ p "*! ... approach fitted to them have been clari fied • • • • [But the approach phenomenology recommends] will not be able to help anyone who is already sure of his philosophy and of h is philosq:>hical' method, and hence has never experienced the despair of one who had the misfortune to fall in love with philosophy and who, even as a beginning student, was faced with a choice in the chaos of philosophies, yet became aware that he really had no choice, since none of the se philosophies had provided for real freedom from presuppositions and none had 15 sprung from the radicalism of a utonomous responsibility for which philosophy calls. (Ideen I� Preface Eng. ed.) It is common knowledge that Husserl's scientific phenomenology f ailed to develop; its potential followers inclined away from t he ideal of phenomenology a s a rigourous science. The reasons for this fai lure are many, some of which reside in real or apparent deficiencies in Husserl's proposed phe nomenological method. At times, Husserl's methodology failed to achieve real rigour; at other time s, his phenomenological reductions were not carried out with sufficient care, so that impurities filtered : throu gh into his results. It is nevertheless my belief th at his intensive studies and sense for rigour suggest much that me rits genuine respect. I do not wish to condemn his approach, although its shortcomings are perhaps many; rather, I should like to describe a related approach, which, in my estimation, is less open to criticism than Husserl's methodology. I have developed a nd proposed this approach elsewhere under the title of 11A Relativi stic Theory of Phenomenological Cons titution". Certain of the essential notions involved ; • t - .... , If ,. .... --**-� •. , ff 4fi ... "'* in this appr oach will be summ�rized in what follows. § 1.3 A new approach to ph�nomenology: de-projection. In its most general f orm, this proposal may be under- stood in terms of the development of a logically sound met hodology which can provide the basis for a meta- discipline capable of investi gating , on a cross-disciplinary level, concepts most basic to disciplines uo which scientific methods are fundamental. It is my belie f that such a meth odology can be developed which will provide a u*seful and si gnificant framework an d method for the interpretation and investigation of the essential constituti on of the domain of possi ble experience, and th us of certain of the theoretical foundations of the sciences. A careful app�ication of this methodology to the task of clarifying these foundations, would complete the successful achievement of the goals of scientific*, phenomenology • . The me thodology developed in answer to this need is intended to establish a procedure for determ ination and correction of a form of invaid reference involved in conceptual misconstructions in foundation work in phenomenology, as well as in conc epts basic to the scien ces, concepts which phenomenology would seek to elucidate in relation to -----':':"!"':- ... the essential structure of experience. I turn now to a brie f exposition of this methodolog y and of th e type of conceptual miscons truction whic h i t is intended to a void and to el iminate. Expressio ns in a natural language are essentially relative to a specific region of discourse. In a si milar manner, a f onn of rela tion in mathematical logic or a sign or symbol of formal language is rel ative either to particulars related in the given manner , or to a definite fonnal system. Objects in gener al are relative to a given universe of me aning. An identifiable phenomenon of whatever kind is relati ve to a determinable region. of identification. Etc. In general, it is possible to cha racterize any phenomenon or theory in relation to other phenomena or the oretical entities to which th e phenomenon or theory is essentially rela tiv e. In this way, the propositi ons of a non-euclidean geometry are essentially rel ativ e to that pa rticular system of geometry for the ir sense am truth-value. These patterns ,t .. . - •. of relativ \ty are to be found in every discipline; the network of relativisti c relations constitutes or provides the fo undation for a discipline's internal unity. An analysis of the se kinds of relat ions can yield some interesting results: it can be demonstrated that if 18 two thi ngs are connected by a rela tio n of essential rela tivity, then to affirm one out of connection to the other is logically inconsistent. As an example, con sider a Cartesian coordinate system simply as a certain kind of system which permits defin ite mea ns of identi fying the position of objects in terms of an ideal origin in the framework. An object, the Cartesian coordinates for which are given, is rep resented in such a way* that its positio n can be located in a Cartesian coordinate system. If the se coordinates -wit hout coordinate- translation are th ought to locate the object from the standpoint of a Polar coordinate system, a conc eptual misconstruction results. By a 'conceptual misconstruction' I mean a 'logically invalid proposition resulting from an improper operation with a set of conc eptual structures' •. The pa rticular type of conceptual. misconstruction which is of significance here is termed a 'projective misconstruction', or, more simply, a 'projection.!� The notion of projection is then define d to be under- stood in the sense that the process of reasoning is a process of coordination. Correct reasoning presupposes val id coordination; incorrect reasoning results from improper coordination. A 'projective misconstruction' is a form of inadmissible coordination. Consequently, in order to el iminate and to avoid this variety of improper . . ,_, '"''_..,,,....,.._ - **�--�-�..,..,.,..,.---**�- ... coordination, the method of 'de-projection' is evolved. De-projection is consequently introduc ed as a procedure for the cla rification and restoration of the regulation of coordinations in accordance with the structuring principles essential to the constitution of a given �Y.stem. Now, a frame of referen ce is the constit utional system that gives to an investigatory enterprise the possibility of its structure, while it both ins ures the possibility of the enterprise having a point, a direction, a sense, and allows for identify ing references within the total structure of the f ramework itself. An identifying referm ce is such that an ascription to that whi ch can be the subject of an ascription establishes that what is ascribed and that that to which ascription is made, are one and the same. Such an a scription determines the references to that w hich is thereby identified such tha t the subject of the identification is fixed within a structure which allows for the p ossibility that the same subje ct can be re-identif;i.:ed. I'*will refer here to a coordinate as a determinant of reference to that which can be the subejct of an identifying reference. A coordinate is therefore essentially identifiable within the coordinate system w hich provides for its possibility. For a coordin atefo be ident ified as such, it must represent in germinal form, as it were, a frame of reference having a constitution derived from the essential ... structures of the coordinate system to which the coordinate belongs. In other words, it is in essent ial relation to the structural principles of a given coordinat e system that a coordinatepossesses its character as a coordinate of a certain system. Specific ation of a coor- dinate involves at least implicit reference to some coordinate system. This view can be compared to Wittgenstein's claim that 11A proposition can detennine only one place in logical space: nevertheless, the whole of logical space must already be given in it • • • • 11 (Tractatus: 3.42) Reichen- bach adds that " • • • every partial* domain characterizes the total field. 11 ( Tjle Theory of Relati vity and A Pr-iori Knowledge: 103) By a �coordinate system' I mean a system from the standpoint of which the possibility of identifying reference is provided to the class of objects studied in the c ontext of the framework of a particular discipline• Thus , a frame of reference is constituted by a cond itioning coordinate system. It shou ld be clear that these uses of the terms 'coordinate' and ., coordinate system' are not the same as the corresponding uses of these terms in mathemat ics. The fact that t he essent ial structu re of a coordinate system is implicit in any coordina te o f that system, permits the use of coordinates with out explicit mention of the coordinate system the y im plicitl y entai l, and is constitutive ... of the complex wherein a coordinate has sm se. If any particular is cons idered in relat ion to its proper coordinate system, the particular must be specifiable by certain coordin ate s. Following Quine's dictum "no entity without identity" (Linsky, Referring 27), it is evident tha t there can be no particular not a particUlar witho� sP�cifiable coordinate s. This is evident because (a) the essential possibility of a particu lar necessarily involves the possibility of identifying reference, {b) the possibility of identifying reference is guaranteed only by the con stitution of a frame of reference, and {c) identifying reference requires coordinate specific ation. A particular is a particular if and only if it has certain specifiable coordin ates, in the sense that a particular is defined as that which can be the subject of identifying reference. There is a tendency to forget or disregard the coordinate systems entaile d when reference is made to different kinds of particulars. Most frequently, this amounts to a disregard of the presuppositions involved in tho se systems, and, derivatively, in any of the var ious branches of the oreti cal investigatio n. When the pre suppo- sitions our tasks involve are overlooke d, when there is neglect to render explicit the coordinates of a partia�lar or class of partia�lars, reasoning is vulnerable to a .. variety of misconstructions, one of the more significant of which I have called a 'projection'. A projection appears to characterize some or all of the coordinates of a particular as independent of the coordina te system entailed by the se coordina tes. A coordinate is meaningful an d valid only if applied w ithi n the limitations prescribed by the regulati ng princi- ples essential to the coordinate system proper to it. If a coordinate is expressed within a coordinate system having structural principles incompatible with tho se the coordin ate requires for its possible sense and validity, the result is meani ngless. Particulars consequently are necesarily relative to the context which prov�des for their possibility. This relativ ity, in turn, is essent ial to the strucuu ral constitution of a coordinate system. Projective misconstructions result from ignoring, or f�omJ'i:gnora.rioe of, the essential relativistic constitution of a coordinate system. The procedure of de-projection would avoid such misconstructions by renderin g explicit in practice affirmation of the essential relativistic constitution of coordinate systems. Through a descri ption of the constitutive elements of a particula r, de-projection ret riev.es to that particular its coordinates which, � projected, are regarded as independent of the coordinate systems entailed by these ... coordinates. In describing a particular or class of p articulars, an attempt is made to enumerate the coordinates proper to I that p articular or class. As already noted, this involves 2:L a description of th e references essential to the possibility of the particular . De-projectio n specifically relates to the referential cha racter of coordinat es. Since this referential character is essent ially a relative matter, de-projectio n is a tool for dealing with the relativistic nature of coordinate systems. The essential structure of a particular may entail one or more coord ina te systems. Clearly de-projection is facilitated in cases where only one coordinate system is necessary for a particular both to have sense and to e>epress correctly the coordinative structure of its system. Such a coordinate system may involve two or more sub-systems at least two being necessary for projection to be possible. This simpler case is taken as paradigmatic of th e others. Consider a coordinate system whose structural principles are known, sin� * e it will facilitate the discussion her e to avoid having to deduce the m from a givm partirular. For example, consider a three-dimen sional Cartesian coordina te system which allows for the possibility of reference to length, width, and height, expressed by the four (x3,y3,z3), which together represent the vertices of a - ,. '4 ¥J " ... tetrahedron. Here is a framework which permits use of the language of volumes. Insofar as volumes are describab le in terms of similarly ordered coordinates, volumes so described are limited to this particular coordinate system for the ir sense and validity. 24 Suppose now that a second coordinate system expresses volumes of the first by "projecting" the coordinates limiting those volumes upon a concave surface, say a section of a sphere. A grid on this surface permits reference to the points so formed. Assuming t hat no two vertices of the tetrahedron "project" upon the same point on the surface, there are four coordinates � .�), (cl'1 , fJ,), ((il{.t., �.t.), ('""3 , f11) which correspond respectively to the "projected" vertices having the same subscripts in Carte- sian notatio n. Now, if it is thought that the coordinate system proper to coordinates (d , fJ), (ot'1 , f3, ) , • • • allows referenc e to "volumes", an instance of a;projective misconstruction is encountered. For the points on the concave surface certainly do not describe volumes at all within that coordinate system. Applicatio n of the con cept of volume is restricted here to the origi nal Cartesian system which allows for the possibility of references to volumes. Insofar as the coordinates (x,y ,z), (x1 ,y1 ,z1), • • • refer to t heir correlates on the concave surface, and in so referring result in the above confusion, the Cartesian coordinates are "projective", in the strict sense of the word. But the sense in whioh the y refer to (t:{ ,fJ), (CI(1 , �), • • • is not ... in itself suf ficient to explain the above misunderstanding; references from (x,y,z) to (o<,�), from (x1,y1,z1) to (ci1,1 ), • • • can be described in a third coordinate system, K, in which specific principles express relatio�ships between all eight coordinate determinations. The projective miscons truction here is necessaril y founded upon such a coordinate system which at once . provides the conditions necessary for the idtial two coordinate sub-systems. The misunderstanding vanishes when it is recognized that th e coordinates (x,y,z), • • • are determinations in a coordinate system in which volume is a permissible co ncept, and that the coordinates (d ,13), • • • are determinations of a coordinate system ,in whxh .the concept of volume is meaningless and its application illegitimate. The system K, then, is. the context for a projection. But as soon as its consti:tutive principles are understood, once the coordinates of its two sub-systems have been de-projected, the references essent ial to particulars in system K are found to be implicitl y relative to that system for their validity and sense, and are articulated according to the principles governing the respective constitutions of its two sub-systems. And once this is recognized, proJective misconstr.uctiomin the system are el imina ted. The above projecti on is contrived and the misconst:uuction sufficiently obvious that projective misconstructions following upon it would probably never take place. Essentially, de-projection is a procedure intended to clarify the structures necessary for the possibility of the ' e ... •• referential character of coordinates. As seen, the descriptive enumeration of these references at once describes th e cons tituti on of the coordinate system which permits such references. The relativity of a coordinate to its proper coordinate system{s) is a relativity constitu - tive of the structur e of the coordinate system{s). When, therefore, the misconstructions implied by disregarding this constitutive<relativi ty are circumvented by heeding the constitutional principles necessary for the possibility of the structures examined, analyses introduce, as it were, no supplementary conteht, presuppositions, or assumptions. (Note the simila rity between this p rocedure and Husserl's reductions.) De-projection is empirical to the extent that its analyses are directed toward subject matter which can be exper ienced. It implicitly treats the conditioning principles of possible structur es. Its;demonstration of elements and relations as essentially constitutive of the structure of a cone� or theory, is deductively scienti- fic. As a procedure intended to lead to accurate description, its formal structure is tautologous for in making explicit the constitutive elements of that which is described, de-projection reaches a point where it is clear that the affirmation of a concept or theory must at once be an .. affirmatio n of those cons titutive ele ments guaranteeing the possibil ity of that concept or theory. It is pr ecisely because de-projection is empty of content that it can authorize a transition from one formulati on to another, while guaranteeing the ir equival ence, and without risking the introducti on of error. A tautology is useful because it is devoid of content. But it should be clear that although�a tautology is empty of content, it is not d evoid of meaning. Not all inconsistent formulations are projective. A projection is a partidular form of inv�lid coordination which must satis fy the following conditions: (1) A projectio n requires as a condition of its possibility that a particular be dis- connected from certain of its essential relations to the coordinating structure required for its possibility. In other words, there must be a severing of the essential relativi ty of the particular to its context. (2) The particular must be asserted to be in certain respects autonomous from its context. Reference must be made t o the particular in such a manner that denies or ignores one or more essential determinants of its contextual relativity. The coordination is projective in th ese respects. It should be understood that these two conditio ns must be satis fied by any projection from the standpoint of an analysis of its essential structure. It is not as if a projective misconstruction takes the form of an explicit severing of essential contextual relations although this may be so in deliberately cons tructed cases. But this condition of explicit severing of essential c oordinative relations must be satisfied once the projection is expressed in t he f orm of an assertio n that spe�ific structures are � essentially connnected to the con text. The first condition specifies that a particular is to be conadered as dislocated from its essential contextual relativity. The second condition specifies* that thi s dislocation is to be formulated in the form of an assertion of the autonomy of the particular from its context. The first condition denies the possibility of the particular by separating the particular from the context necessary for its possibility. After F.B. Fitch, such a denial is termed 'self-referentially inconsistent.' The separati on involved is strictly speaking impossible, so long as reference is actually understood as intending a certain particular. However, what is said of that parti- cular namely, that it is autonomous from the context conditioning its possibil ity comprises a self-c�ntradictor y and projective assertion. From the standpoint of de- projective analysis, the ab ove separation must consequently be considered a mistaken separation. The second condition, then, asserts the particular while excluding the grou nds for its possibility. Thus, a projective misconstruction would attempt to disconnect two ... '* ... 29 or more thin�which are essentially relative to one another, where this essential relativity of the one to the other is necessary in order for either to be possible. The el imination of projections £ollows according to the rule s given in the coordinating structure of the co ntext within whic h the projection is made. As such, this elimination also follows the rules of co herent parametric analysis. The princ iple central to the notion of parameter is a field of variation limited and controlled by identity conditions. In a parametric fo�mula, it is possible to .discriminate . (1) a constant or id entity conditio n, (2) a class of particulars called the field of variability, and (3) a rule of order or set of relations holding between the partic ular determinations. Parametric analysis would attempt to arrive at an unambiguous definition of a given parameter, while assertin g that the limits of its variability, and hence its application and exte nsion, not be violated. Three distinc t moments of analysis are made prior to the de-projective correctio n of a projective misconstruction. First, the constitutive coordinative structure of the concept ox theory must be adequately described. This description must specify the essential restrictions imposed by th is structure upon possible coordinations. Second, the assertion involved in the projective misconstruction must be explic itly formulated. The formulation will specify the nature of. the projective demand by designating the nature *..,. Hi ff if .. of the asserted autonomy of the given concept or theory from its conditioning context. Third, the opposition of the projective dema nd to the regulativ e pri nciples of the context mus+e ver ified to result in a con tZTadictory and meaningless for mulation. Together, these prel iminary analyses render explicit the constitutive structure of the given context and demonstrate that reference to the concept or theory in question is at once a necessary reference to those constitutive elements guaranteeing the possibility of 30 that concept or theory. De-projective analysis is completed with a reconciliation of the cons titutive coordinate structure with the misconstruction which was original ly in oppsiti on to that consti tution. This final phase of de-projection involves a correcti on of the projective coordination, imposing upon the coordination regulatio n according to t he regulative structure of the context, which in turn,: conditions the possibility of reference to the given concept or theory. � 1.4 The two ap!_i)roaches to phenomenology. I have briefly described Husserl's idea of phenomenology. as a rigou rous science. Phenomenological methodology was seen as providing the basis for a science which sets the .. 31 task for itself to study the general nature of all science. Phenomenology, accordng to this view, is a science of maximum theoretic generality capable of investigating the transcendental foundations of the various scientific disciplines, its own transcendental fou ndation included. I have chosen to replace or per haps re-form ulate phenomenological me thodology along more clearly define d lines. De-projective;methodology would attempt to make of phenomenology a meta-discipline in the sense of Kant's notion of a "negative science". But, I do not believe that th is discipline can afford to rem ain wholly ne gative, and oo, in the corrective phase of de-projective analysi s, a given projective concept is replaced by a logically sound concept to serve the non-inconsistent functions of the original concept. The constitution of such a de-projective phenomenolmgy provides the basis for a variety of important forms of r eference. Fundamental conditioning patterns of rela tivity are brought to light in r elation to regions of possible experience essentially structured by those patterns of relativity. The framework of de-project:io n provides £or the possibility of re-identification of given members of the class of phenomena which it see�s to investigate. This cla ss of phenomena is defined to comprise the ... class of objects constituted in relation to certain given 11attentional characters", that is to say, the )possibility for the correlation of such "attentional characters" with a given particular is constitutive of the system entailed by reference to the particular. The notion of attentional characters is best left undefined for my punposes here. It is sufficient to understand that a varie�y of egological modification or pragmatical reference to a subject is intended. Thus, phenomena are objects of reference which are given in terms of a system guaranteeing the possibility of a gene ral sort of pragmatical reference to a subject. A pre-critical introduction of such notions as 11consciousneas", "subjectivity", "intentionality", "psychical act", etc., would defeat the purpose of methodical de-projective analysis. In a neutral sense neutral with respect to any such pre-critical distinctions the class of phenomena can be cons idered coincident with the domain of possible experience. Where, for Husserl, "dubitable nature" is bracketed, projective misconstructions are eliminated in de-projective analysis. An "essential residuum" is left for each: for de-projection, a de-projectively clarifie d field of phenomena; for Husserl, indubitable consciousness. At times, these residua overlap; usually, however, the y do not, and there the similar ity to Husserl's phenomenological reduction breaks down. 33 In concl usion, I should like to say the obvious, namely th at not all I have suggested was said wit h an expectation that it would be transparent after a single reading. Th is has been something in t he nature of an intentional shortcoming, so that I might attempt to outline in practice, rather than in survey, some recent ideas in the traditiDn of scienti fic phenomenology. If an approximate although not altogeth er clear notion of the nature of its enterprise has emer ged, then I should consider my discussion here successful. Section Two: New Rhetoric § 2.1 The concept of a new rhetoric. In my exposition here of what is to be understood by a new rhetoric, I proceed, as in § 1.1, by means of a series of selective idealizations. That is to suggest, once again, 34 that, like strict phenomenology, a new rhetoric has not been proposed without the appearance of certain amb iguities which make it difficu lt to represent without bias its sphere of concern. For this reason, reference is made to "a new rhetoric", i.e., to� ideal representation reflecting certain views of some of its advocates. The recent conference at the Center on "The New Rhetoric" leads me to think it might be excessive to include a more or less self-contained exposition of Ch. Perelman's ideas on the matter.* For my purposes here it will be sufficient to consider a group of concepts which, although not concerned with the acquisition of practical rheto rical techniques, relates to what may be calle d the theoretical basis of a new rhetoric. I will consequently distinguish between (i) argumentation functioning to bring about foundational elucidation in a sense related to that discussed in §9 1.1-1.3, (ii) the structure of argumentation which effects the positive adherence of individuals * They are to be found in (TA] and [IJPA]. ... to a particular point of view, and (iii) the practical means for accomplishing (i) and (ii). Certain notions fundamental to (i} and (ii} will be examined in what follows. Perelman states that the rhetorical dime nsion is unavoidable in every philosophical argument, in every scientific discussion which is not restricted to • •• calculation but seeks to justify its elaboration, and in every consideration of the principles of any discipline whatever •••• ["The New Rhetoric" CSDI .7] 35 This "rhetorical dimension" has to do with the first principles or values upon which deductive and inductive results and the conclusions of argumentation in general are based. Thus Richard McKeon would define 'argumentation' in relation to a self-conscious and conscientious inquiry into "sanctified values." [CSDI] These values are not to be equated with the axioms or primitive propositions chosen in connection with a particu lar system of reasoning; rather, they provide t he basis for that choice. Therefore it can validly be claimed that "all discussion presupposes adherence at the outset to certain theses, failing which no argument is possible." [TA: 54. Cf. also pp. 65ff] In th is sense, a new rhetoric would provide the foundation fo r a discipline whose domain of inquiry extends over the presuppositional structure of assertions in relation to the modalities of the credence that underlies the selection of th at structure. By implication, the practical dimension of rhetoric will consist in influencing the nature and degree of assent given to thos e assertions. .... The theoretical ba sis of new rhetoric is, then, the foundation for argumentatio n in McKeon's sense. Like most 36 gener al theories, the modality of this foundation is possibility*: possible presuppositions, Qossible conclusions to whic h th ey can lead, in relation tb thei r capacity to convince and persuade, comprise the material for study. ? 2.2 The concept of audience-relativity. Since rhetoric, as it is described here, inquires into the values which motivate both the ch oice of basic principles and the degree to which they are adopted, it is but a small step to realize that one or more individuals are essentially relative to this choi ce. For it is individuals who choose, give assent, bel ieve; individuals are swayed, persuaded, convinced. Because the modality of argumentation is possibility, it is easy to see that an individual who is amenable to persuasion enters into consid eration only as a possible individual. To tha t extent, he can be cons idered to rep resent a group of similarly constituted individual s. ThulS, an auditor is regarded "as a specimen of a whole category of listeners." [TA: 39] Such a *This view has been argued by McKeon, e.g., duri ng [CSDI], and by Perelman, whose formulation reads: "The domain of argu- mentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the probable, to the extent that the latter eludes the certai nty of calcula- ti ons [modality: necessity]." [TA: 1] group of individ uals, or category of listeners, is said to comprise an audience. It follows immediately that "it is in relation to an audience that all argumentation is developed." (IJPA: 13S]* It must also hold, then, that argumentation is weak or 37 strong relative to an audience.** Standards by means of which the strength of argument can be measured reflect a rhetorical choice as to the values such strength is to embody. Measurement of the strength of argument is therefore possible only with reference to a particular standpoint, incarnated in a group of individ uals. Essentially, then, the theoretical basis of a new rhetoric will be pragmatical. § 2.3 The concept of universal audience. An argwaent is addressed to one or more individuals. If they are similarly constit uted in terms of commonly accepted values, they comprise an ideal single audience. Now, if a group of individ uals are similarly constituted vis-a-vis their common adherence to a set of tenets of rationality*** used as a final * Remarks on th e relativity of rhetoric to an audience are found in (TA: 7, 14, 19, 21, 25, 110, 507, and passim.]. ** Perelman made this obser vation during (CSDI]. *** Perelman defines "the universal audience" in tenns of "that invariant faculty, present in ever y normally constituted human being, which is reason.*' (IJPA: 127] Consequently, "the universal audience" may be regarded as an "incarnatiorl'of the concept of reason. .... norm in argumentation, then the audience they form is termed 'a universal audience'. I call such an audience 's universal audience' rather than 'the universal audience' because I am ready to admit a *plurality of different sets of "tenets of rational ity". My jus tification for so doing will be found in Since any group of individuals who together adhere to a set of values is said to comprise an ideal single audi ence, a universal audience is to be regarded as an ideal construc t. [Cf. IJPA: 169] The sense in whi ch it is considered an ideal construct is th is: It has been noted that arguments are relative to t he individuals granting the f irst principles or values without which argumentation is impossible. An argument is here said to be "properly addressed" if the individuals of the group to which it is addressed share the first principles of the speaker to a degree sufficient to allow for the possibility of argument ation. If an argument is properly addressed, then the relation between speaker and hearer(s) fulfills the ab ove condi ti on, and argumentation can proceed. In that case, the speaker might be said to uhave in mind" or "intend" an ideal audience which in fact is realized. On the other hand, if an argument is improperly addressed, then argumentation is obstructed, and the "ideal audience intended" by the speaker does not correspond to the constitution of the audience an audience which he fails to address. If the concept of audience is relativized, as it has b een here*, in terms of the relation * The identification of variations in audience-concept does of course rely upon standards permitting the assessment of suc h .... between speaker and hearer, then it is clear that there can be no .2.n§. ideal universal audienc e. Thus, th e concept of universal audienc e is co nstituted in relati on to a common postulated agreement over a set of 39 first principles. Variations in the intended universal audience may be determined in relati on to different sets of stand ards for what is, for example, real, true, and objectively valid. Other standards may be used, for example, those pertaining to level of competence, degree of in$ight, or* whatever. (Cf. TA: 33) [t shou ld be clear that the distinction be tween a universal audience and an audience which is not universal, is drawn on the basis of the characteristics of the first principles commonly accepted by individuals of the group. When these first principles can be legitimately termed 'tenets of rationality', then the group may be characterized as a universal audience. Perelman restri cts these tenets to those upon Which deductive or inductive analysis relies. Argumentation, as I have described it, includes at least several varieties, two of w hich relate to deductive and inductive argumentation. When argumentation occurs relative to a non-universal audience, the audience may be termed (as does Perelman) a 'particula r audience'. I prefer, however, to permit more flexibility, and would therefore distinguish audiences on the mare neutra l basis of the k inds variations. A framework applying these standards does not, clearly, lay any claim to being in any sense an "absolute" framework; it is, as it were, a metauniversal audience, which is no more absolute itself than the various universal audiences which it serves to characterize. ... of facts which the audience accepts. The natur e of such basic fact-sets will be clarified in § J.J. § 2.4 Audience-pluralism. As already noted in � 1.3, valid application of a concept is relative to a frame of reference. From the standpoint of the variety of new rhetoric described here, the constitutive principles of a frame of reference are represent ed in ideal form in relatio n to a group of {possible) individuals who have in common adherence to a set of basic principles. In relation to this concept of audience, it can be asserted (i) that 40 "the me aning of notions depends on the [audience-] systems in which they a re used • • • " [TA: 134], as well as (ii) that methods are in general relative to their respective field{s) of application by an audience. [Cf. IJPA: 121] It follows that such concepts as "true," "valid,11 "real," "good," "just,11 "likely," "nonnal," etc., depend upon the framework determining the meaning and use of those concepts.* In other words, a plurality of meanings and uses of such concepts can be associated with a pluralism of audiences for which these different meanings and uses are acceptable. The statement *Perelman maintains that the "concept of 'normal' depends on a reference group, that is, on the whole category for whose benefit it was established ... [TA: 72] ... 'What is considered valid by an audience A, and invalid by an audience B, is indeed invalid', requires rhetorical analysis. 41 It may be th at there are two different notions of "validity" used by the two audiences; perhaps the statement illegitimatel y equates the two notions; perhaps again, recourse is made to yet another , more inclusive, concept of validity. The realization that criteria are audie nce-relative provides the basic guideline in such analysis. Generally speaking, studies in rhetorical struc tures will themselves involve adherence to certain criteria. Of particular importance is the following principle: "Rejection of incoherent interpretations is a priori a thing to be recommended." [TA: 125] This "internal rule of interpretation" would appear to be proposed by Perelman as a negative standard for inadmissible forms of argument. The following section will consider one significant standard of this kind. 9 2.5 Autophagia. If (i} the truth of opposing the principle of non-contradiction and (ii} the falsity of the view of its adherents are asserted togethe r, then an autophagy results. [Cf. TA: 204] 'Autophagia' is a term used by Perelman to denote self-referential inconsistencies.* He says in this connection that application of a * See above, p. 28. 203] 42 187] • • • 204-5] may 195] ... A technique of practical rhetoric is to subject advocates of incoherencies to ridicule: Ridicule • • • is the weapon that must be used against those who take it into their heads to hold and persist in holding two incom- patible points of view without trying to remove the inco mpatibility." [TA: 206] Arguments which serve to point out inconsistencies invo lved in making a thesis must be taken into account to avoid ridicule. When certain distinctions involve autophagia, rhetoric would ser ve to break the sanctity of those disti nctions. In this, McKeon suggests [CSDI] rhetoric would proceed by inquiring (i) What is the function of these distinctions? (ii) How do these distin ctions fall short? (iii) How can these distinctions be re-formulated along a sound argumentative basis? 43 Consequently, a new rhetoric would admit th at arguments remain subject to future revision, particularly so if they shou ld be found incoherent. In this, rhetoric adheres to t he 11pr inciple of revisability" recorrunended by F. Gonseth. [Dialectica 6(194S) 123-4] � 2.6 The concept of self-evidence. A. J. Ayer has established three conditions necessary for claims to knowledge: first, the proposition in qu estion must be ... 44 true, second, one must be certain of it, and, third, one must have a right to be certain of it. [Cf. The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan 1956), p. 34] Argumentation, in its different forms, would claim to arrive at various types of knowledge; each type of knowledge should accordingly be characterizable in terms of the concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion- right which are utilized. Perelman describes knowledge of a non-deductive and non-inductive sort in terms of a tested opinion • • • which has survived all objections and criticisms and w ith regard to which we have a certain confidence, though no certainty, that it will resist all such future attacks. [IJPA: 117] In one manner or another, in relation to a particular form of knowledge, the concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion-right are normally considered to arise from, or to be reducible to, a more basic conception of self-evidence. In general, to say of something that it is self-evident means tha t it can be regarded as a fundamental given upon which the structure of knowledge is based. A proposition which is regarded as self-evident usually is considered to be so in connection with a particular set of concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion-right. Thus, it has been suggested, for example, that a sel f-evident proposition is such that "anyone who can grasp the meaning of its terms is certain of its truth." [IJPA: 110] The grasp of its individual terms is not of course sufficient; one must furthermore be able to grasp the meaning of the proposition as a whole in terms of the meanings of its ___________________________ , __ . __ , -----------45 component parts. What exactly such a "grasp" will consist of, will depend on the particular criteria of knowledge agreed upon. It is appropriate to recall here the distinction normally under stood between evigence and what is self-evident. A proposition bears a claim to truth if it can be demonstrated either (i) by one or more additional propositions which are known, or considered, to be true, or (ii) by reason of its own struc ture, whatever th at may be. Evidence is relied upon in (i), where self-evidence would be involved in (ii). I Shall restrict 'evidence' to it s use in conjunction with that against which one does not argue. CCf. IJPA: 134] 'Self-evidence' will relate to the pre suppositional structure of a sy stem which is incapable of, or incompatible with, rejection, for the reason that such rejection becomes sel f- referentially inconsistent, and perha ps projective. [Cf. TA: 101] A self-evident proposition is therefore one which must be accepted if argumentation is to be possible. It is of interest to mention scepticism over whether what is self-evident in a given system is ••really" self-evident. An investigation of this sort of scepticism will show that different concepts of self-evidence are intended, that these concepts are illegitimately equated, or that the sceptical argumentation involves autophagia. The problem here will re-appear in different guise in 9� 3.1 3.2. ... � 2.7 Conviction and rationality. It ha s been noted that a new rhetoric would investigate the relation between structure of argument and it s capacity to persuade and convince.* All forms of argument attempt to gain adherence to "rational" decisions [TA: 62], using this term flexibly in relation to audience-pluralism, as describe d in 46 § 2.4. Since a new rhetoric attempt s to describe the relation between the structural and normative components of argumentation [TA: 463], it will be useful to describe a view which considers a close relation between rationality and conviction fundamental and desirable. [F]or Socrates the essential character istic of all • • • arguments which he parsues is not truth but conviction; the conviction Which welds belief to action. It is perhaps this faith which is at th e root of Socrates' assurance that virtue is knowledge. In this way, A. Sesonske, in his article "Plato's Apology, Republic I" [Phronesis 6(1961), 29-36] draws attention to the Socratic concern that argument must go hand-in-hand with a conviction \tklich leads from the realm of phil osophic discourse to the wor ld of practical action. The strength of this link between valid argument and commitment to its conclusions as a guide for action depends on the extent to which the argument * I do n ot, with Perelman, reserve the term 'persuation' to application to the adherence of a "particular audien ce". See ['rA: 28, 30J. ... 47 has persuasive force and can convince the members of an audience that what is true should be adopted by them in their sphere of activity. It is clear in the Meno and in the Republic that Plato did not consider that true know ledge could be bestowed on anothe r; rather, it came only through dialectical involvement in questi oning. This process of question and answer, which in Plato assumes the form of dialog ue, is governed by the supposition that if truths are arrived at, those involved in dialogue will be compelled by the force of the argument to acknowledge these truths. Not only will they come to accept these truths, but with this acknowledgement will come a fundamental c onviction that will over-flow the boundaries of argumentation and will influence them to practice the truths which they have been persuaded to affirm. It is clear that this connection between argument and practical affairs, between knowledge and action, between the conceptual affirmation of princ iples and influence upon behavior, can and does break down. It breaks down, as Sesonske suggests, when there is refusal to 1 isten to the argument, when "the hubbub of Demos" drowns out the voice of reason, or when the sp oken words are taken as a game, lacking in seriousness. It was against this breakdown that Plato fought. But why? Why not accept the breakdown and give up the attempt to persuade and convince? Why was the connection between knowledge and action essential to Plato's outlook? It is this question which .... I would like briefly to explore. To Greek thinkers, reason is the very con dition for man's having a moral being; by reason they und erstand that in man Which permits him to live for something. The rationality of man is tha t which enables man to have ideals. The notion of an ideal involves that W1ich is never totally realized, while it also involves that which is in a process of realization. It is by virtue of reason, that man can think beyond the moment and live for an end. It follows that, in the Greek conception, the moral life is practically identical with the rational life. The best life is the one lived accordi ng to the prescriptions of rationality; for it is the life in which action and thought are wedded as means to the end or telos of life, wh ich Plato calls the Good. Reason, then, is the ultimate condi�ion of moralit y; it is also the ultimate condition of understanding. An object is intelligible insofar as it is organized according to an end or principle which must be assumed in order to explain it. The more the functio n, end, or imminent principle of anything can be detected, the more it may be understood. A man's life is good in the proportion tha t it exhibits a purpose which directs his action; the more a man's life assumes a structure and a plan by vi rtue of rational goals, the more his life is good. Man's life becomes intelligible and good in proportion as rationality serves to guide his thought and action. 49 Now, the connection between rational ity and life led according to its prescriptions is conviction. Convictio n is the essential link between reason and intelligent, moral action. When this link breaks, Pla to's concern begins. His is a concern to maintain and to strengthen the bridge between the reasonable and the desirable; withou t thi s tie, morality is rendered impossible. It is in this sense that a new rhetoric is orie nted toward both the structural and the normative components of argumenta- tion. The bond between the two is expressed as a value fundamental to the rhetorical enterprise, a val ue which that en terprise woul d advance and pr omote. ... Section Three: Towards a Unified Concept of Reality § J.l New rhetoric and the doctrine of absolute truth. Adherence to the notions of audience-relativity and. of relativity of standards of rationality to audiences, generates the question whether, according to the view of rhetoric 50 advanc ed here, there is one truth , or various truths, each relative to an ideal group of similarly constituted individ uals. Does this new rhetoric adopt the principles of a bi-valent system, in which a meaningful proposition can be resolved in one and only one of two ways: either it is shown true, or it is shown false? The position taken by Ch. Perelman is ambiguous: For example, he says: When a stick is partly immersed in water, it seems curved when one looks at it and straight when one touches it, but in reality it cannot be both curved and straight. While appearances can be opposed to each other, reality is cohe rent: the effect of determining reality is to dissociate those appearances that are deceptive from those that correspond to reality • • • • [B]ecause of th ei r incompatibility, appearances cannot a�l be accepted together • • • • [TA: 416] The con cept of "reality" consequent to the dissociati on of concepts in the appearance-reality pair, functions to eliminate incompa- tibilities that may obtain in the sphere of "appearances." ... 51 Reality, so regarded, is a norm for dis tin guishing data deemed of value from rejected data. This norm opposes, in an absolutist fashion, the simultaneous truth of both terms of an opposition. The stick "cannot be both curved and staight." Perelman grants as basic the principle of non-contradiction. (Cf. IJPA: 147f] On the other hand, he observes that rhetoric has been criticized by those "for whom there was but a single truth in every matter." [TA: 45] This would, by inference, suggests that rhetoric may sanction "more than one truth in a single matter." Certainly this view follows upon an acknowledgement that ther e are a plurality of sets of rational first principles, where each set supports its own set of truths. Perelman's familiarity with formal systems and with variations in judgmen t-sta ndards from epoch to epoch, and from culture to culture, should provide him with ample evidence of the existence of such a plurality. Furthermore, it is basic to his con cept of rhetoric to "combat uncompromising and irreducible philosophical oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism • • • • " [TA: 510] In §q J.J 3.4, I will suggest how a new rhetoric can accept repudiation of incohe rency While it, at the same time, avoids a doctrine of absolute truth. § ).2 Fundamental concerns shared by strict phenomenology and new rhetoric. It might seem strange at first sight that strict phenomenology and new rhetoric migpt share common concerns. I have characterized ... 52 Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a "scientifically effective Cartesianism," while Perelman asserts in the opening paragraph of The New Rhetoric that his view of argumentation "constitutes a £reak with a concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes." [TA: 1; underlining his] Phenomen ology sides with Descartes; new rhetoric opposes him. Must phenomenology and new rhetoric therefore be opposed? There are important differences between the two in terms of meth ods employed in practice. For Perelman, new rhetoric seeks to gain ascent to theses which cannot be demonstrated through the use of deductive or inductive technique!. Strict phenomenology, as I have descri bed it, seeks to elucidate the nature of concepts fundamental to a given discipline. It proceeds in this task by means of a variety of deductive logical analysis. The question to consider is 'Are there, in spite of these differenc es, similaritie s between these two enterprises?' My reason for thinking that there are significant similarities between the tasks of a new rhetoric and of a strict phenomenology, is that both are concerned with the most basic principles which must be admitted if a given f orm of argumentation is to be possible. As Perelman states: The method of [every] • • • science implies • • • a choice • • • of the facts deemed relevant, choice of hypo- theses, choice of the theories that should be confronted with facts, choice of th e actual elements that constitute facts. [TA: 116; cf. also 119] 53 The nature of this choice is, as noted in § 2.1, investigated in new rhetoric. This choice reflects a value or presupposi tion without which argumentation is impossible. In relation to my characterization of it her e, "a new rhetoric would provide a foundatio n for a discipline whose domain of inquiry extends over the presuppositional structu re of assertions in relation to the mod ali ties of the credence tha t underlies the selection of that structure." [§ 2.1, p. 35] Strict phenomenology, on the other hand, is a discipline concerned to elucidate the conditioning structure of phenomena, where phenomena are objects of reference in a pragmatica l context. [p. 32) The subject-matter of strict phenomenology is taken in essential relation to a pragmatical basis. The domain of study proper to phenomenology is that of possible experie nce. Rhetoric has been presented in its theoretical aspect as argumentation which is essentially related to a pragmatical basis, i.e., relative to a group of individuals who ideally make up an audience. The in dividual hearer who is to be affected by argumentation has the status in rhetorical theory of a possible individual. [§ 2.2] Thus, a new rhetoric studies certai n Rhenomena, particularly phenomena of adherence. �Robert Caponigri has suggested [CSDIJ that a phenomenology of modes of adherence be developed in connection with studies in rhetoric. His recommendation would, I believe, provide a potentially useful contribution to research into "the phenomenological foundations of rhetoric. •• In a word, the two disciplines are concerned with that ------------------------------ - ***- ** 54 which must be granted for argumentation [cf. p. 35] and, by extension, discourse in gene ral to be possible. But What is of particular significanc e is that each discipline can be of service to the other. Studies in new rhetoric can serve to point out areas phenomenologists ought pay close attent io n to in developing the phenomenological foundations of pragmatics. In retu rn, phenomenological studies can serve to elucidate the foundations of rhetoric, communicating to contributors to new rhetoric an increased awareness of their own work. To conclude this section, I shall take the opportunity to enumerate a few of the similarities between de-projective phe nomenology and new rhe toric: (i) Perelman's reference to value hierarchies [TA: 82] as coordinative structures for the purpose of ranking relative goods of the values they coordinate, comprises a special case of a general coordinative framework. (ii) Refutati on of autophagia in particular modes of argumentation bears certain similarities to the first condit ion for a projective misconstruction. [Cf. above pp. 27-28, and TA: § 48 "Breaking of Connecting Links and Dissociation"] (iii) Rejec tion of connecting links in argumen- tation is similar to the denial involved in the formulation of a projection. [Cf. TA: § 89] (iv) In new rhetoric, autonomous use of the material and formal aspects of a prob lem disappears. [McKeon: CSDIJ Similarly, the material and formal components of a phenomenon are essentia lly relative in de-projective analysis: disconnecting them results in a projective misconstruction. ... (v) In rejecting incoherent diss ociations , both de-pr ojective analysis and new rhetoric make recourse to the following couples: valid-invalid, meaningful- meanin�less, co nsistent-inconsistent, etc. lSuch couples are regarded, in de-projective analysis, in relation to specific frameworks to which they are relative.) (vi) Both strict phenomen ology and new rhetoric attempt to promote and estab- lish certai n values regar ding rational decision-making. They both possess the character of classical epidictic rhetoric, since, in the fullest sense, both take the question of decision in terms of the education of a listener to a par ticular world view. [Cf • TA: 48-51] § ).) Facts. The starting point of argumentation is al ways a set of values and relevant facts which ser ves as a point de repere, and upon which knowledge is based. This is true, whether or not argumentation is viewed as including the deductive and inductive forms of reasonin g appropriate to the sciences. In the matter of persua$ion it is often overlooked that the advocate of scie ntific methods must since persuading is a practical activity base himself on the ethical principle that it is better to believe truth than fal sehood. [B. Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," reprinted in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P.A. Schilpp (New York: Harper and Row 1963), p. 724] It is in connection with this question as to the nature of fundamental rhetorical ch oice that I sh ould like to explore 55 ... the notion of a fact. In the view Which I shall recommend, facts become the representatives of basic postulates of reasoning. These "facts" are ther efore very different from the class of "facts" whi ch phenomen olog y would bracket. Rather, facts here will be regarded as .,the unshakeable basis of all knowing." [IJPA: 129 J A vague distinction can be drawn between (a} facts which 56 are pointed to as constituting evidence [§ 2.6, P• 45] supporting the conclusion of argument, and (b) facts Which must be accepted for argument to proceed. The reason why I suggest that thi s distinction is vague, is that a fund amental judgment must be made as to what is acceptable as a fact, and this judgment is the same one which underlies both senses which can be given to the word 'fact'. Both strict phenomenology and new rhetoric presuppose sets of facts appropriate to each disci pli ne.* Something can be ack nowledged as a fact only in relation to a set of norms or standards which are usually agreed upon in connectio n with each of the vario us kinds of reasoning.** Consequently, it is in relation to these norms or standards that the concept of fact is described. * For this point, vis-a--vis new rhetoric, cf. [IJPA: 170]. ** For this reason, Perelman restricts his own treatment to thos e sorts of facts which are crucial to non-deductive, non- inductive reasoning. [IJPA: 169; TA 67] I will not follow suit, since I have taken 'argumentation' in a less restricted sense than he does. [§ 2.1] ... Facts are relative to propositions asserting them. What a true propos ition asserts is a fact. A proposition which is 57 confirmed or verified is, provisionally or otherwise*, asserted to be true.** Thus, "any truth enunciates a fact." [TA: 69] A fact is, once again, what a true proposition asserts, and it is, one may add, that which a false propos ition denies. Note, however, that a fact cannot be true or false; facts render assertions true or false.*** Facts are not possible subjects which can be named; they may be asserted, denied, believed, wished, etc. What makes a proposition true or false cannot assume the position o f logica l subject. What gives a proposition a truth-value can only be expressed as something to be asserted, denied, etc. Thus, what permits the specification of a fact as such, cons ists in a framework in whic h relations can be established bet ween an individual (who asserts, denies, • • • , a proposition} and the world of things the indiv idual encounters. In other words, a pragmatical framework is necessary in order that facts may be specified and verified. * On presumed ver sus observed facts, cf. [TA: 74]. ** Richard McKeon has advanc ed th is position. [CSDI] *** For a related treatment of the concept of fact, see [B. Russell, "Philosophy of Logical Atomism," reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.C. Marsh lLondon: Macmillan 1956}, pp. 1772�h] and [I'.forris Weitz, "The Unity of Russell's Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Schilpp, pp. S5ff]. ... To paraphrase Frege*, first th ere must be an apprehension of what is attended to. Second, there must be a recognition that what is apprehended is factual, i.e., is the case. It is here that verification enters in. Third, a judgment is made concerning the status of what is or is not capable of verification; this takes the form of an assertion. �en a judgment is confirmed and asserted, what it asserts is a fact. § 3*4 The complementarity of facts. The channels selected for connecting facts determine the concept of reality one has i n view. Assessment of the truth of an assertion is relative to the context in which it is made. This context expresses th e framework and system of values to which the members of an ideal audience adhere. A notion of audience-relativity and audience-pluralism can immediately be extended to an acknowledgement of the relativity of facts to the ideal representation of a partic ular framework by an audience. Thus, what is in this sen se factual in relation to one framework need not be factual in relation to an other framework. From the standpoint of a bi-valent frame\'lOrk, two propositions asserted in t wo different contexts may be found contradictory. * Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," reprinted in Essays on Frege, ed. E.D. Klemke (Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press 19 8), p. 513. 59 Now, if each assertion is true relati�e to the context in which it is made, then the facts asserted in the two propositions are termed 'complementary facts'. In other words, facts asserted by contradic tory assertions are complementary provided that each assertion is true relative to its proper context. Consequent ly, contradictory theses which have been verified in rela tion to different modes of observation can be regarded as asserting a complementarity of the facts they refer to. Certai n facts on the quantum level at present appear to be complementary in this sense. If it is granted that there are a variety of systems equipped with standards for evaluating the real, the t rue, and the objectively valid, then th ere is a plurality of objectively real facts, certain of the relations between which are relations of complementarity . Thus, the assumption of a plurality of modes of rationality calls for the application of the principle of tolerance vis-a-vis these different modes. [Nathan Rotenstreich, "Argumentation and Philosop hical Clarifi- cation, P• 7, CSDIJ Now, Perelman has argued that "revision [of an axiom] cannot be effected by an argument developed within the system to which the axiom belongs." [TA: 105) If a doc trine of absolute truth is a basic postulate for Perelman's concept of rhetori c, then adherence to a view of the complementarity of facts would be organic to a rather different variety of rhetoric. Whether this is in fact true, must be left for Perelman and his commentators to deter.mine. .. But whatever the case may be, Perelman doe s claim that opposition to the dissociation of appearance and reality "leaves entirely unresolved the problem that is raised by the incompatibility of appearanc es.•' [TA: 419] The following questions are at issue: 'Is there in fact an incompatibility 60 of appearances?' 'If so, what is the nature of this incompati- bility?' 'Why would such an incompatibility become problematic?' 'If indeed it does, would a vision of reality based upon a doctrine of absolute truth resolve such a problem satis factorily?' I will attempt to answer the questions, in the same order. Appearances can only be described to give rise to incompa- tibility if they are considered to have the same status, and if they a re assessed in terms of the same standard or norm. If appearances require different contexts for their possibility, then it can sometimes be illegitimate to place them on the same footing, and to judge them with the same se� of criteria. By implication, the question whether facts are incompatible or complementary will turn on whether th e facts are asserted in the same, or in different, contexts. Incompatibility of appearances becomes problematic either when they are illegitimately treated by equating dissimilar contexts, or when they are found to conflict in t he sam e cont ext. A doctrine of absolute truth is not satisfactory if a variety of differen tly con stituted contexts is admitted. Consequently, it is my s uggestion that (i) ther e is ... 61 frequent ly no need to treat phenomena on the basis of incompati- bility, (ii} to do so is often illegitimate, since (iii} there are in fact a plurality of "modes of rationality." [Cf. § 2.3] The appearance-reality dissociatio n "expresses a vision of the world" [TA: 420], a vision which can certainly be traced through Descartes' to those of antecedent philosophers. If one considers this dissociation "to be the prototype of all conceptual dissociati on" [TA: 415], the de-projective and rhetorical elimination of illegitimate forms of reasoning will effect a view of reality as constituting a multiver se, rather than a universe. A multiver se of phe nomena can be studied coherent ly only if complementarity is accepted as a phen omenon of fundamental importance. • ..